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BAD WEALTH
–Retesting the Relationship Between Natural Resource Abundance and Democracy–
 Abstract
How does natural resource abundance influence state and society? Since the late 1980s, 
a number of scholars have confronted the widespread predisposition to view resources 
overly optimistically, as a blessing. They claim instead that resources are in fact a curse 
that affects economical, as well as social and political institutions in a decidedly negative 
manner. The aim of this paper is to retest the negative correlation between resource 
abundance and democracy presented by Michael L. Ross in his article Does Oil Hinder 
Democracy? from 2001. This is done with an arguably  improved measure of natural 
resource wealth, based on rents, not sales value. In line with Ross, I use a cross-sectional 
time-series data set where observations from all sovereign states are compiled over thirty-
five years, and analyze them with a feasible generalized least squares method. The results 
reinforce Rossʼ main conclusion that oil wealth harms democracy and that this effect is 
valid all over the globe. His claim that this property is shared by hard mineral wealth 
receives only mixed support, however. On the whole, these findings serve to strenghten 
the notion of a curse of natural resources and further advances the generality of this 
theory. 
I acknowledge the support and assistance from the Department of Political Science at Göteborg 
University. Sverker Jagers and Niklas Harring have with patience guided and encouraged me 
through a thesis that has outgrown its clothes several times. Marcus Samanni has assisted me 
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Economics, have given me much-needed help with the statistical analysis. I also want to thank 
Jens Nilsson for invaluable proofreading. The views expressed here, as well as all remaining 
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1  Introduction
Confounded by  his strange misfortune—rich and wretched—he was anxious to escape from 
his unhappy  wealth. […] Lifting his hands and shining arms to heaven, he moaned. “Oh 
pardon me, father Lenaeus! I have done wrong, but pity  me, I pray, and save me from this 
curse that looked so fair.”
-King Midas1
 Natural resources have long been looked upon as a prime mover in the creation of 
economic wealth, and consequently, a lack of valuable resources are considered a 
plausible prediction of stagnation and poverty. Wealth, in turn, is according to the 
persistent modernization theory  the most decisive determinant of democratic transition and 
resiliency. This theory, as presented by Seymour Martin Lipset in his seminal 1959 paper, 
asserts that wealth and subsequent development induce certain changes in the social and 
political landscape that establish the foundation for democracy. 
 So wealth is considered good, and if wealth is created by natural riches, their existence 
must presumably be a blessing. But consider these retrospective contradictions: How 
come 17th century Spain with its overflowing New World treasure chest could be eclipsed 
by resource-deficient Netherlands? Why could eventually the U.S. and Canada, two 
countries that Voltaire portrayed as “a few acres of snow”2, so vastly outperform resource-
intensive South America? How did Japan in the 20th century succeed to become one of 
the richest countries on earth despite having virtually  no natural resource endowments 
whatsoever? And more recently: How can a country like the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo simultaneously  be arguably  one of the richest nation in the world measured in 
natural resources, and one of the poorest the poorest measured in democracy  and 
stability?
 These questions certainly have no easy, monocausal answers, and I claim no such 
thing. However, I believe they might suggest something concerning the presumed blessing 
of natural resources. Looking back it is intriguing that so many resource intensive states, 
especially  since the second world war, have failed to perform in line with expectations. 
Explanations of this disturbing phenomenon has been diverse but starting in the 80s 
scholars began treating natural resources per se as an explanatory variable of interest. 
4
1 Cited from Ovidʼs Metamorphosis, book 11 (http://www.theoi.com/Text/OvidMetamorphoses11.html).
2 Cited in Sokoloff & Engerman [2000:217].
1;1  The Curse of Natural Resources
 The main postulate of this literature is that the “widespread popular impression” (Sachs 
& Warner [2001:832]) that natural riches constitute a blessing, must be challenged and 
indeed overturned: Problems in resource-rich countries arise, not despite natural 
endowments, but rather because of them. This is most reminiscent of the Midas myth, 
although in a modern context. Just as the blessed golden touch of King Midas turned out 
to be a curse in disguise, resource wealth appears to be a possible source of distinctly 
negative outcomes. The opening citation from Ovid certainly cause an eerie feeling.
 In a recent article, Andrew Rosser emphasizes the considerable impact this discourse, 
called ʻthe curse of natural resourcesʼ, has had upon the ʻoldʼ attitude: “So influential has 
this literature been that the conventional wisdom now is arguably the exact opposite of 
what it was prior to the late 1980s.” [2006:268] I partly disagree. However influential the 
resource curse scholars have been, their findings are hardly “widely accepted” (ibid.), 
probably because of the potentially  controversial policy implications the theory carries. 
James Mahonʼs statement from 1992 that "few have argued that there is an advantage in 
resource poverty" still holds validity. [:252] Instead, common people, officials and 
politicians alike seem to almost without exception endorse the possibilities of resources, 
rather than the dangers. Former President Bill Clinton claimed for example in 2000 that 
"[w]ith one-fifth of Africa's people, and vast human and natural resources, a revitalized 
Nigeria can be the economic and political anchor of West Africa and the leader of the 
continent."3  And even related scholars appear to sometimes view the bonanza of natural 
riches in an overly optimistic way, such as William Ascher, who seem to have missed the 
initial findings in the field (see section 2): "[The resource curse] concerns miss a crucial 
point: natural resources represent potential wealth; without the resources, developing 
countries would be even poorer." [1999:6]4
 Of course, natural resources are not actually  malignant as such, harming nations the 
way kryptonite harms Superman. They  do represent a potential wealth and indeed, not all 
countries with resources have fared badly but on the contrary benefited from their dealings 
with primary commodities, e.g. Norway (petroleum), Botswana (diamonds), Malaysia 
(minerals/petroleum) and Chile (copper). However, wealth extracted from nature seem to 
5
3 Cited from http://www.ngex.com/nigeria/govt/president/clinton_obasanjospeech.htm
4 But note the contrasting cynicism of Auty [2001:33]: "One might be forgiven for concluding ... that the faster 
resource-abundant countries deplete their resource rents, the sooner they can embark on the advantageous 
path of competitive industrialization.”
carry  some odd properties, distinguishing it from other type of revenues, and perhaps this 
justifies the seemingly contradictory label bad wealth. 
 While many studies in the field tend to focus on finding key conditioning circumstances 
that could influence the curse, the overall aim of the present paper is to retreat one level 
and in the context of democratic performance re-examine the badness of resource wealth. 
This is done with, in my mind, an improved measure of natural resource abundance, which 
hopefully will shed some more light upon a puzzling phenomenon and influence future 
policy-making. For while the myth tells that Midas in the end was relieved of his golden 
curse by the Gods, the same fate is not likely to happen in the real world to countries rich 
in resources.5 
❧
6
5 With due respect towards those who put their faith in divine intervention. 
2  Theory & Earlier Research
We are in part to blame, but this is the curse of being born with a copper spoon in our 
mouths.
-Kenneth Kaunda, former President of Zambia6
 As touched upon above, the idea of natural resources7  being a curse was first 
developed in the late 1980s when economists, most notably Gelb  [1988] and Auty [1990], 
started emphasizing the counterintuitive performance of resource intensive nations. 
Revenues generated by resource extraction were found to largely wither away and even 
have a pronounced negative impact on the domestic economy. As later shown by Sachs & 
Warner [1995:16] these states have actually been economically  outperformed by  resource-
poor ones. Among the eighteen developing countries that experienced growth rates of 2% 
or more per annum between 1970 and 1992, they distinguish only two as being resource 
intensive.8  Another much-cited scholar, Terry Lynn Karl [1997], fittingly  describes this 
situation as a paradox of plenty.
 A second aspect of the curse is that resources seem to influence the onset, as well as 
the duration and intensity  of civil war. One of the seminal studies, made by Paul Collier 
and Anke Hoeffler [1998], e.g. found the relationship  between natural resource wealth and 
twenty-seven civil wars to be strong and curvilinear: Natural riches increase the risk of 
conflict up to the level where they, measured as primary  commodity exports, constitute 
about a third of GDP. The risk then drops, presumably  because the governments in these 
nations become rich enough to either deter violent opposition or defend themselves if it 
arises. Scholars also stress the dysfunctionality  of these wars, since they are often driven 
by greed rather than grievance. (See e.g. Le Billon [2001:562], Collier & Hoeffler [2004] 
and Weinstein [2005].)
 A third sub  literature, which is also the newest and least investigated one, advances yet 
another, equally adverse, claim: Natural riches also show signs of being harmful for 
democracy. I will shortly  move on to a detailed presentation of this ʻresources hinder 
7
6 Cited in Ross [1999:297].
7  Although the discourse does not provide an agreed-upon definition of natural resources, primary 
commodities, such as petroleum, hard minerals and gemstones, attract most interest by far. Agricultural 
goods are most often ignored or excluded. (Although some focus on e.g. forestry (Ross [2001a]), plantation 
crops (Isham et al. [2002]), or agricultural dependency (Humphreys [2005]).) 
8 They note that Botswana would have qualified also, if data had not been missing.
democracyʼ proposition, which constitutes the theoretical foundation of this study, but first I 
want to introduce some relevant skepticism and make known my own approach to it.
2;1  Causal Direction?
 It is possible, and some would say probable, that the causality regarding all these 
correlations is misinterpreted. Instead of being a cause, natural resources could in fact be 
an effect. That is:
• An economy in stagnation looses diversity  and momentum and therefore becomes ever 
more reliant on primary commodity exports. 
• In a nation struck by civil war the only lucrative economic activity at hand is resource 
extraction. 
• Since an undemocratic regime cannot rely on obedient tax-paying citizens, and does not 
want to diversify the economy (which could lead to a diffusion of power) natural 
resources are the autocratʼs best friend. 
Under all these three conditions, resources (or rather resource-reliance) could have the 
appearance of causing bad effects when the relationship  is actually the other way around. 
To this I respond accordingly: Of course resource-dependence is not only a cause but an 
effect as well. This is, in my mind, why the strong word ʻcurseʼ is justified. Resources 
create a trap  and are most detrimental in this self-created trap. In addition, an intensifying 
bouncing effect probably occurs between the economical, political and social problems: 
Democracy is for example inherently fragile in poor countries. Authoritarian politics tend to 
promote violence as the only decisive means of arbitration and violence then induces even 
more authoritarian measures, such as martial law and curfews. Civil war is of course 
disastrous for the economy, and so on. Eventually, low-income resource-states get caught 
in a catch-22, where poverty and misery forces them to extract bad wealth and this wealth 
forces them further into misery and poverty. 
 So the real question is; what came first, the resources or the problems? This, to be 
sure, is a hotly debated subject.9  Some scholars stress the importance of institutions as 
determining the impact of resources (see especially Mehlum et al. [2006] and Rosser 
[2006]), while others argue the other way around (most prominently Sokoloff & Engerman 
[2000] and Easterly [2002]). Without delving into this dispute, I think that while institutions 
8
9  Neither, according to U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney. "The problem”, he claims, “is that the good Lord 
didnʼt see fit to put oil and gas reserves where there are democratic governments." (Cited in Ross [2001b:
337])
surely have important impact, it is not reductionistic to put at least some blame on 
resources per se, first and foremost due to the fact that there are simply too few countries 
on which resource wealth have had a positive influence. Among developing nations, 
references are invariably made to the same examples; Botswana, Chile, Malaysia, and 
sometimes Indonesia, and they strike me more as exceptions to a rule than anything else. 
 In sum then, I believe that while resource-dependence probably is an effect, plain 
statistics suggest that they are also a plausible cause and that is how I will treat them. 
2;2  Natural Resources & Democratic Performance
 To properly understand how, and why, natural resources interact with political 
institutions it is essential to grasp the theory  of the rentier state, and to achieve this we 
must first deal with the economic term ʻrentʼ. 
 When a valuable commodity, such as oil, is extracted, there is a significant difference 
between combined production costs and sales value. Because of land ownership the state 
can claim some of this profit without actually participating in the very  extraction and this 
financial surplus is then called rent. You could say that while large profits make rent 
possible, it is the collection that makes it visible. Note that collecting financial surplus is a 
non-contributory activity, or as Adam Smith once put it; "the income of men who love to 
reap where they never sowed".10  This revenue is instead characterized by the collector 
having control over other actorʼs access to certain production opportunities. Possible 
sources of this control, besides land ownership, are e.g. tolls and fees collected from the 
usage of roads, bridges, tunnels and canals, patents and monopolies, or production-, 
import- and export tariffs. (Scherzer & Sinner [2006])
 To further differentiate rents from other state revenues, Mick Moore also distinguishes 
an income as either earned or unearned. The latter is defined as revenue requiring "little 
organizational or political effort on the part of the state apparatus, and especially little such 
effort in relation to their domestic population". ([2004:304] See also Moore [2006:16]) Note 
that this definition excludes normal tax.
9
10 Cited in Karl [1999:43].
2;2;1  The Rentier State Theory
It matters whether a state relies on taxes from extractive industries, agricultural production, 
foreign aid, remittances, or international borrowing because these different sources of 
revenues, whatever their relative economic merits or social import, have powerful (and quite 
different) impact on the stateʼs institutional development […] Simply stated, the revenues a 
state collects, how it collects them, and the uses to which it puts them define its nature. 
Terry Lynn Karl [1997:13] (My italics.)
The budget is the skeleton of the state stripped of all misleading ideologies.
Joseph A. Schumpeter, 199111
 The idea that the source of income might have a pronounced effect on the government 
has only quite recently entered broad comparative studies on development and 
democratization. In the early  1990s, scholars began to examine the role of broad taxation 
as a cause of democratic transition and the core assumption, often called the ʻno taxation 
without representationʼ claim, crudely have the following rationale: In a tax state, revenues 
from below are assumed to be exchanged for representation and accountability from the 
top. Taxes thus form a vital democratic leverage in the relationship between citizens and 
political elites, creating a state-society balance that encourages bargaining and 
consensus. Empirical proof of this theory is derived from European history.12
 However, it is possible to turn this theory upside down, change the claim to ʻno 
representation without taxationʼ, and along similar logic explain the lack of democratization 
in states with substantial non-tax revenues. This is the rentier state theory. If there is a 
guaranteed external source of income, why should any political leader pursue democracy 
or promote broad development, and thereby create conflicting interests within the state? 
The most effective strategy to ensure continuous rule in such states is by buying off and 
beating down, thus making bad policy  good politics. The use of this strategy is evident in 
e.g. oil-rich Saudi Arabia and many other resource-intensive nations around the globe.
 The economist Hazem Beblawi is most often credited with defining the characteristics of 
a rentier state. In such a state, he contends, a rentier situation predominate the 
governmental revenue structure in which (i) rents are acquired from foreign sources, (ii) 
they accrue directly to the government, and (iii) very few citizens are actually participants 
in the rent-generating business, with the majority only being beneficiaries of distribution. 
(Ross [2001b:329])
10
11 Cited in Moore [2004:298].
12  For a thorough review see Moore [2004] and [2007]. Ross [2004] tests the claim in a large N statistical 
analysis. 
 The fiscal situation in a rentier state is therefore typified by a dual capacity: the ability to 
draw sizable rents from external sources and subsequently to discriminately  distribute this 
wealth internally. Political and economical control are thus intertwined and this affects the 
framework for decision-making. The close links between economic and political power 
make the rentier state somewhat similar to a socialist one, something that according to 
Karl [1999:37] eludes most observers.13 
 Before moving on, it should be noted that Beblawiʼs definition make no claim as to what 
could generate these rents. Oil is indeed the rentier commodity par excellence, due to 
enormous surpluses easily captured by the state, and its capital intensive, rather than 
labour intensive, extraction. The same may however be true for other so-called point-
source commodities, such as minerals, as well as for transport fees and aid in otherwise 
poor countries. However, with the exception of oil, few rent sources have potential to 
dominate the state budget.
 The benefits of holding power in a rentier state are of course, for any politician bent on 
self-enrichment, substantial. Large rents make the state a prize to be possessed, rather 
than a forum for consensual rule, and simultaneously constitute a significant incumbency 
advantage, by providing the means of maintaining hold of power.14  That is why Lam & 
Wantchekon [2003] label the rentier phenomenon ʻa political dutch diseaseʼ; i.e. a political 
system which tends to suffocate any opposition and indeed all other actors.15 
 In short, rentier wealth creates and perpetuates strong states with weak societies, thus 
keeping democracy at bay. As presented below, authors of this theory point to at least 
three different reasons why democratic transition will not occur in those states.
11
13  Ironically Lenin wrote in 1916: "The rentier state is a state of parasitic, decaying capitalism, and this 
circumstance cannot fail to influence all the sociopolitical conditions of the countries concerned". (Cited in 
Ross [2001b:329]).
14  The notion that political actors act only in their own self-interest of course springs from a rational actor-
perspective. According to Ascher [1999:ix] this is the “easy” explanation. “The trick”, he continues, “is to 
grapple with the much more complex reality that governmental leaders have complicated programmatic 
objectives, while not being so naive as to ignore their self-centered political motivation.” (ibid. :x) Rosser 
[2006:21] backs this view, claiming that the rational actor approach is blind to relevant structurality. 
Nevertheless, there is often a point in analyzing a phenomenon from an aggregate, and perhaps simplified, 
view. Picturing political leaders autonomous of social pressures makes it easier to perceive the isolated 
effect of resource rents on their behavior. For example Robinson et al. [2005] argue for this stripped 
perspective in their examination of how resource windfalls lure politicians into patronage politics.
15 Esanov et al. [2001:15] present a striking example of this in the context of former Soviet states.
• Autonomy
 According to the ʻno taxation without representationʼ-claim, broad taxation leads to 
engaged citizens and subsequent formation of civil society groups, either because people 
resist paying those taxes or because they want to ensure a proper and effective use of 
them. The rentier scholars adapt this logic and propose that since resource states have no 
need of taxation their societies lack this engagement. The state is almost a private 
enterprise providing the citizens with certain benefits without emptying their pockets and 
relieved from taxation they presumably do not demand anything of the state in return.
 This ʻdemocratic apathyʼ can of course be pursued more or less consciously, e.g. 
through low-quality educational systems that keep common people sidelined (see Birdsall 
et al. [2001]) or propaganda endorsing the nation as the core of community to hinder civil 
society development and quell critical voices from opposition or media (see Lowi [2004]). 
To stay in power, political leaders even employ foreign firms and workforces which keep 
power concentrated and leaves the population immobilized and locked in poverty. An 
agreement between Sudan and China has for example brought literally thousands of 
Chinese workers to Sudan to open up new oil fields in the oil-rich, though unruly, south. In 
return Sudan has received substantial military  aid, and according to an Amnesty Report 
even Chinese armed guards.16
• Redistribution
 Support can also be acquired and consolidated through a comprehensive system of 
patronage politics and clientelism. Rents serve as a lubricant, insulating governments by 
dampening dissent and buying off opposition. Oft-cited Giacomo Luciani, has suggested 
that rentier states do “not need to formulate anything deserving the appellation of 
economic policy: all [they need] is an expenditure policy.”17 
 The rentier state both provides substantial funds easy to misallocate and invites little 
public scrutiny. An embezzling politician will, once he reaches office, counteract demands 
for transparency, and eventually patronage is ʻthe only game in townʼ. In small states, such 
as Brunei or Qatar, the patronage system can in fact shelter the whole population.
12
16 Sources: Human Rights Watch 25/11/03: “Chinaʼs Involvement in Sudan: Arms and Oil”. HRW Index No. 
1564322912. Insight on the News 24/07/00: “Chinese Troops Wreak Havoc in Southern Sudan” by Katherine 
Edwards. 
17 Cited in Rosser [2006:16].
• Repression
 If redistribution functions as a carrot, repression works the other way around; as a whip. 
Similar to other states, resource states can resolve to violent means in quelling dissent. It 
does not really matter if people actually  are pacified (the autonomy claim) or bought off 
(the redistribution claim) since a powerful police-, military- or security force can step  in and 
suppress any manifestation with democratic intent. However, whereas in a state reliant on 
tax revenue, too much repression would lead to economical self-strangulation, hard force 
in a rentier state will not affect governmental funds to the same extent.
 Resource states do appear to have large military expenditures, at least as a proportion 
of GDP.18  Karl [1999:39] claims that OPEC members on average have spent more than 
10% of GNP on defense, a figure that is several times higher than most countries. 
2;2;2  ‘Does Oil Hinder Democracy?’ 
 The rentier theory has not, however, escaped criticism. (Indeed, no theory should.) 
Scholars have in particular challenged the idea that tax breaks and rent-redistribution 
would actually  keep the public politically inactive and even content with an undemocratic 
regime. Lowi [2004] suggests e.g. that patronage may “camouflage” but seldom “mitigate” 
societal dissent in these states, making “uninterrupted distribution of rents … the key to 
their survival.” [:98] Okruhlik [1999] asserts that rent revenues for a fact do not relieve the 
state from democratic pressures: "Throughout the Middle East and North Africa, in both 
have and have-not states, there are demands for social justice, meaningful economic 
development, and political reform." [:296] She instead emphasizes the counter effect of 
discriminatory methods, such as patronage and clientelism, suggesting that the very 
measures to promote, or enforce, continuous rule actually  lay the foundation for its own 
demise. (See also Lam & Wantchekon [2003:5]) 
 Okruhlik [1999] also makes a more basic comment: The Western scholar, she notes, 
often approaches the rentier situations in Mideastern and North African countries with a 
largely subconscious bias. He, or she, tends to regard the state with a Weberian 
conception of statehood, overstating the exchange between state and citizens, and 
evaluate the society  with Marxist eyes, exaggerating the importance of class structure in 
countries most often defined by other divisions, such as family, tribe, region, and religion. 
13
18 Of course, in total spending the USA outclass everyone. In 2006 their defense budget alone amounted to 
46% of world military expenditure, with the second largest spender, the UK, only reaching 5%. Source: The 
SIPRI Yearbook 2007. 
With this biased approach it is not surprising that it is exactly these factors that are found 
missing. 
 Herb [2003] also delivers a more general blow at the praxis of employing a theory 
derived from the Western experience to explain a non-Western phenomenon. While taxes 
may have had a prominent role in the democratic transitions of many Western states, they 
could very possibly function differently in other places.
 The common theme in the critique above is that it highlights potential theoretical hubris. 
The summarizing verdict of Okruhlik [1999:308], for example, is dire: "The idea of the 
rentier state has come to imply so much that it has lost its content." 
 Michael L. Ross, a much-cited resource curse-scholar, has acknowledged this, and tried 
to amend it.19  The body of empirical evidence underpinning the rentier theory has been 
coming from selected case studies of Mideast petro-states, and this is problematic, Ross 
[1999:313] notes, since "theories of the rentier state [thus] have been applied only  to 
states identified ex ante as rentier states, leaving little variation on an independent or 
dependent variable." This approach also ignores Islam, an important control variable.
 Meanwhile, more extensive democratization studies have traditionally  excluded these 
rentier states, on the basis of them being sui generis. (Ross [2001b:328]) However, the 
framework of the rentier theory does not limit itself to Muslim petro-states but is arguably 
valid in all cases of extreme resource-rent dependency and the reasons to exclude the 
Mideast from general democratization studies are at best thin and bordering on 
reductionist thinking.
 In his 2001 article Does Oil Hinder Democracy? Ross presents his response to these 
problematic circumstances. He employs a pooled cross-country  data set over all sovereign 
states from 1971 to 1997 and statistically tests the generality  of the claim that resource 
revenues inhibit the democratic performance of a state. Other potentially  important 
variables, such as per capita GDP, are controlled to ensure greater confidence that it is 
actually resource rents that cause harm. I have illustrated his approach in figure 1.
14
19 Ross currently works out of UCLA as a associate professor and most of his publications are available at 
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/.
 In summary, Ross finds robust support for several propositions, most notably  the 
following three: 
• Oil does hurt democracy. A  one standard deviation rise in his Oil variable predicts a .49 
drop in an eleven point democracy index, over a five-year period. [:342]
• This attribute is shared by hard minerals, although to a lesser degree. 
• The phenomenon is not strictly regional: Oil and minerals have anti-democratic effects all 
over the globe. 
 Ross also claims to find at least tentative empirical support for the causal mechanisms 
proposed by the rentier theory and picture his results as a vindication of this theory.
2;2;3  Measuring Natural Resources
 The observant reader has noted the box linking resources to its democratic effect in the 
figure above. ʻExport Valueʼ is of course Rossʼ operational indicator of resource 
abundance, or in other words, his independent variable. All scholars studying the resource 
curse phenomenon who want to assert a certain claim one way or the other experience the 
following predicament: How do I define and measure ʻnatural resource abundanceʼ? 
Needless to say, this measure is of profound significance. It is the foundation upon which 
all findings will be built. Rosserʼs [2006] literary review traces some basic confusion in this 
aspect, both concerning how to measure (the ratio of natural resource export to GDP, the 
ratio of resource export to total export or a non-export based measure?) as well as what to 
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measure (primary commodities, point-source commodities, various minerals or just 
hydrocarbons?). This is also a focal point for criticism aimed at Rossʼ findings. 
 Ross wants to evaluate the assumed effect of natural resources on democracy, and to 
do so he follows a standard procedure, which has been to do a market value approach 
and in a straightforward manner measure the face value of oil and mineral exports as a 
fraction of GDP. One of the reasons most studies used this approach is that until recently it 
has been the only data readily available. But, as Moore [2007:21] quite firmly states; 
“these are not the right things to measure. [---] The proper measure of the likely political 
impact of natural resource wealth should begin with the rents, not sales value.” In a more 
recent article, Ross [2006:266] himself notes that “[t]his ʻresource exports to GDPʼ 
measure was originally developed by Sachs & Warner (1995) and later adopted by Collier 
& Hoeffler (1998) and many others—including, regrettably, me”. (My italics.) Moore, along 
with Wantchekon [1999:20], Herb [2003:2], and Rosser [2006:268] are among those who 
therefore call for another, more appropriate, course of action: a rent-based measure, in 
which the country-specific production costs, the rental rates, have been subtracted from 
sales value.20  In my opinion, it is obvious that the costs of lifting a barrel of oil from 
beneath the sand dunes of the Gahwar Field in Saudi Arabia are significantly  lower than 
drilling for one in the Ekofisk Oil Field, on the bottom of the unruly North Sea (and pay 
Norwegian salaries for having it done to boot). 
 The data necessary for constructing this new, arguably improved variable are now 
available through a World Bank environmental economics project.21 That this is the ideal 
data for my purpose is something two of the originators of this project also highlight: 
A particularly  appealing topic for further research would be an exploration of the “resource 
curse” hypothesis. […] The data developed for the genuine savings analysis should permit 
more precise definitions of resource dependence, permitting the hypothesis to be re-tested.
Hamilton & Clemens [1998:12]
The following example, based on actual data, undeniably demonstrates the importance of 
measuring rents, not export value.
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20 It is of interest to note that while Rosser and Moore both have published working papers for the Institute of 
Development Studies, they reach divergent conclusions regarding the results of using a rent-based measure. 
While Moore [2007:21] states that the data support the ʻresource wealth impedes democracyʼ-claim, Rosser 
argue that it so far has “provided only mixed support”. (Rosser [2006:268]
21 See http://go.worldbank.org/3AWKN2ZOY0 for further information.
In 1982 Namibia produced about 50,000 metric tonnes of copper and Malaysia produced 
about 30,000 tonnes. The traditional approach would use the market value of these 
quantities (the average price per tonne in 1982 was $1543) and find that the copper income 
for Malaysia that year was about three fifths out of Namibia's, or to be more exact; about $46 
millions, to Namibia's $77 millions.22 However, it is important to account for production costs 
and this basically  cuts the rent in half.23  The next step is however more decisive. As it 
happens, the rental rates differ quite considerably  in between the two countries; Malaysia 
mined and milled their copper at a strikingly  low cost per unit, only  about 10% of market price 
that year, while Namibia produced theirs at an rather high cost, more than 70% of market 
price. The result is certainly  conclusive: Despite Namibia producing 20 000 tonnes more than 
Malaysia, the rent estimation shows that they  only  made just about half the profit; $21 million 
to Malaysia's $41 millions.
 In my view, there are few reasons to doubt that the overall result of using a rent-based 
measure of natural resource abundance provides a considerably  more accurate 
foundation for analyzing the resource curse phenomenon, than does the old-fashioned 
approach.
❧
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22 Of course, it is by all means not certain that they both actually exported all their copper that year. 
23 The average rental rate for copper 1985-94 was 0.49. (Hamilton & Clemens [1998:8]) 
3  Method & Material
3;1  Specification of Aim & Questions
 The aim of this paper is to retest the findings of Rossʼ large N statistical analysis from 
2001. This is done with one decisive modification: I replace his export-based measure of 
natural resource abundance with a rent-based one.24 (See figure 2 below.) Similar to Ross, 
I employ quantitative data to answer three questions:
1.) Does hydrocarbons hinder democracy?
2.) Does hard minerals hinder democracy?
3.) Is this effect regional or global?
 The first question tests the core claim of the resource curseʼs political field by 
regressing oil-, gas-, and coal generated rentierism on the democratic performance of a 
state. Since oil and gas have rentier capabilities par excellence, the effect should be 
visible here if anywhere. Bear in mind that this test carries a potential bias against the 
Mideastern region, which houses several huge oil exporters, and also against Islam, since 
some non-Mideastern petro-states also have a sizable Muslim population (e.g. Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Brunei and Nigeria). Having said that, there are other petro-states included 
here that are neither Mideastern nor Muslim and they constitute a variation of great 
importance. 
 The second question expands the original proposition in a sectoral dimension25  by 
assessing whether other minerals (e.g. copper, zinc and gold) share the possible 
properties of hydrocarbons. Since many mineral-reliant states are located outside the 
Mideast, this test increases the desired variation. It evaluates whether petroleum has 
some unique effects on the state or if the perpetrator rather might be rentierism per se. 
 Finally  I want to see if the effects are valid all over the world or if they are somehow tied 
to one region or another. I test this geographical expansion by adding regional dummies to 
18
24  The study by Ross has indeed already been retested with a rent-based measure. Collier & Hoeffler 
[2005:17] deal briefly with Ross' claim, and yield affirmative results. Their primary objective is, however, to 
examine the role of rents in government as an intermediate factor between resources and economic growth. 
Besides, they use different sample frame, time frame, model, and method. In my view, Ross' findings are of 
such importance that they are worthy of a less deviating scrutiny.
25 See Ross [2001b:327].
the regression, controlling for the regions most correlated with petro-, and mineral states 
respectively. How does this affect the results? The breaking of sectoral and geographical 
barriers really put the expanded rentier theory  to the test, and arguably increases the 
validity of the final results. 
***
 The subsections below present method and material in more detail. Unless stated 
otherwise, I have more or less tried to copy the approach of Ross (see [2001b:337]). It 
should be noted though, that it is not in the scope of this paper to put the proposed causal 
mechanisms to the test (which Ross does).
3;2  Research Method
 To test the hypotheses regarding rentierism and democracy I use statistical analysis of 
a cross-sectional time-series (CSTS) data set, in which I have pooled annual data from all 
sovereign states with a population of more than one hundred thousand, between 1970 and 
2004.26 
 A dilemma for a study of this kind is that one must often make a tradeoff between 
analyzing causality and generality. In pursuit of the former, doing a case study is the 
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26 CSTS data is characterized by its use of fixed units repeatedly observed over time. This distinguishes it 
from panel data which are built upon randomly selected units, and while the latter are in need of a large N 
sample frame, the usefulness of CSTS data is dependent on a large T. The thirty-five serial observations of 
this study are however more than enough. Beck [2001b:274] characterizes T < 10 as being problematic. 
natural choice. Numerous such studies have already been made and they provide a 
selection of credible causal links between resource wealth and authoritarianism. These 
cause-and-effect relationships are however hard to generalize and such claims have so far 
had marginal impact. Criticism has in fact been directed at the findings on basis of them 
beeing too theoretical. (See section 2;2;2)
 For this reason I retreat one step  and focus on the general applicability of the theoretical 
suppositions. In my opinion, and Rossʼ, this initial test must be carried out before the 
results of earlier studies can be fully  appreciated. With this in mind, statistical analysis of 
quantitative large N data is the optimal approach. I believe this design, structured by the 
three questions above, has the potential of addressing and appeasing the cautionary 
remarks that have been directed at earlier studies. A CSTS data set yields as much 
variance on all variables as possible, offering a sample frame that includes not only 
predefined rentiers, but also non-rentiers, possible rentiers, and everything in between the 
three. This aspect is of utmost importance when pursuing generality. 
 To study a political phenomenon, such as the resource curse hypothesis, using insights 
from both spatial comparison and from dynamic research over time may undeniably  offer 
great analytical strength. Even so, this is a design not seldom avoided since using data 
jointly  structured in time and space also presents the analyst with some intricate 
complications; “the opportunity  to be wrong is considerably enhanced when the design is 
two-dimensional", as Stimson [1985:916] notes.
 In short, the statistical assumptions justifying the ordinary least squares (OLS) approach 
stipulate that the error terms must be uncorrelated with each other and have equal, or 
constant, variances. In the context of CSTS data three violations of these assumptions are 
expected to appear: Observations of different units (countries) may be correlated to each 
other, i.e. spatial correlation27; the errors of one single unit probably correlate over time, 
i.e. autocorrelation, and finally, the variances of errors may be unit-specific, not equally 
distributed, a phenomenon known as heteroscedasticity.
 These violations would cripple the OLS estimation of errors and as Beck & Katz 
[1995:2] observe: "Incorrect standard errors will lead us to be either too confident or 
insufficiently confident about whether our findings might merely be statistical artifacts." 
OLS is therefore no longer the optimal statistical estimator.
 I follow Rossʼ lead and instead use a feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) 
method, which corrects for the cross-sectional problems of spatial correlation and 
20
27 Although this violation is in fact caused by omitted variables and thus is an error of the observer, it is not 
always easily corrected for since the researcher sometimes cannot, or maybe does not want to, include more 
variables. (Beck [2001b:281])
heteroscedasticity. I counterbalance the problem of autocorrelation over time by adding a 
lagged dependent variable to the right-hand side of the equation. The regressions are run 
with Stata 9.1.
3;3  Variables28
 I derive my dependent variable, Regime, from the Polity IV data set29, constructed by 
Marshall & Jaggers [2002]. This measure evaluates the democratic performance of a state 
on an eleven point interval scale that stretches from 0 (perfect authoritarian) to 11 (perfect 
democratic). 
 Building upon the argument presented in section 2;2;3, which defines rent as the 
difference between country-specific extraction costs and international market value, and 
using the World Bank data, I construct a rent-based independent variable with which I 
replace Rossʼ export-based one. The natural resources for which rent data are available 
are oil, gas, hard coal, brown coal, bauxite, copper, iron, lead, nickel, phosphate, tin, zinc, 
silver, and gold, with the data covering thirty-five years; from 1970 to 2004. For every year, 
and every country, I divide the oil-, gas-, and coal rents by GDP to construct a 
Hydrocarbons variable, and I divide the ten other mineral rents by GDP to construct a Hard 
Minerals variable. Rentierism is consequently measured between 0 (no rentierism) and 1 
(total rentierism).
 The World Bank data I employ here carry  some possible weaknesses. First, it is 
important to realize that the adjustment for country-specific extraction costs is not 
completely  accurate. Here follows a few potential drawbacks:30 
i) Some commodities, e.g. gas, have no universal world market price. In these cases 
annual averages have been derived from existing prices. 
ii) The average extraction cost of most countries is in fact not country-specific but 
obtained from a surrogate country with similar conditions. These figures are therefore 
approximate since small deviations between countries are expected to exist. 
21
28 All variables and their specified sources are more fully presented in Appendix 1.
29 Ross uses the Polity 98 data set.
30 For a more detailed account see Hamilton & Clemens [1999] and Bolt et al. [2002].
iii) Countries may sell their product for internal consumption for a price well below the 
international price.31 This would lead to somewhat overstated resource rents. 
iv) Of course, every cost not calculated would induce rent-overestimations.
 Secondly, using only the World Bank data brings at least two limitations to the fore. 
First, they provide data on only  fourteen different mineral commodities, neglecting others 
(such as diamonds and aluminum). Second, rents not generated by  natural resources, e.g. 
various transit fees over land or through canals, are of obvious reasons also absent. Both 
restrictions result in an undervaluation of rents in some governments, and especially the 
first one could seriously  harm the Hard Minerals variable used in this paper. Until data on 
more minerals are available the validy  of this variable is unfortunately undercut and any 
results should be viewed with that in mind.
***
 To simply regress rentierism on a democracy score is certainly not enough, since any 
correlation between the two might be either spurious or maybe caused by a third 
underlying variable. It is e.g. possible that it is actually high levels of per capita GDP that 
correlate with democracy and that rentierism only thrives in relatively poor countries. In 
such a situation rentierism could be a result of poverty and therefore covariate with 
authoritarianism but not be a determinant of it. Even though statistical analysis can never 
prove anything else than correlation, we can enhance the likelihood that resources actually 
do play a causal role. For this purpose I include important control variables. 
 Income is widely held as a powerful predictor of the democracy score of a state. (Ross 
[2001b:338]) "The more well-to-do nation, the greater the chances it will sustain 
democracy", as Seymour Martin Lipset [1959:56] stated. I control for Income, measured as 
real per capita GDP. Data are obtained from Penn World Table 6.2 by Heston et al. [2006].
 Another variable of import is religion. Controlling for religious and cultural influence is 
called for since Islam both correlates positively with oil and gas and negatively  with 
democracy. (Ross 2001:338) By testing the explanatory power of natural endowments, the 
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31  Consider e.g. the presumably euphoric Venezuelan drivers who pay about $0.07 per gallon gasoline, 
according to recent figures. Source: The New York Times 30/10/07: Venezuelaʼs Gas Prices Remain Low, 
but the Political Costs May Be Rising by Simon Romero.
sometimes voiced claim that Islam carry an anti-democratic essence are simultaneously 
scrutinized.32 Islam is measured as the Muslim percentage of the stateʼs population.33
 Since the strongest predictor of a stateʼs regime often is its own past, I include a five 
year lagged dependent variable, Regimet-5 (where t is the year). Apart from diminishing 
country-specific historical and cultural bias, this method has two additional advantages: It 
both makes it possible to measure dynamic change over time and corrects for first-order 
autocorrelation (mentioned above). This process is panel-specific in that it allows the 
degree of autocorrelation to vary from country to country. 
 While Regimet-5 encapsulates country-specific history, I also want to uncover possible 
region-specific effects. It is possible that the correlation between rents and authoritarian 
rule merely  reflects the political situation of a region that also happens to be endowed with 
natural resources. I therefore add three regional dummy variables to the regression, 
Mideast, Arabian Peninsula, and Sub-Saharan Africa, to account for the most resource-
intensive regions in the set. (In accordance with Ross [2001b:346] I include the Arabian 
Peninsula dummy since the Mideast could be a too encompassing geographical unit.) 
 Yet one determinant of democratic strength seems to be European heritage. I will not 
present any theories as to what make ʻWesternʼ states susceptible to democracy (or non-
Western ones unsusceptible), and I take no position regarding possible causes behind this 
effect.34 I merely control for it with OECD, a dummy that is coded 1 for the twenty-five high-
income members and 0 for all others.
 Finally, since several petro-states have small populations and the rentier effects in these 
could be given overly much influence, I also want to capture the potential importance of 
size. Size is a dummy, coded 1 if a state has a population of more than one million, and 0 
otherwise.
 Like Ross, I use a five year lag on all independent and control variables to ensure 
greater confidence that the causal direction is not reverse. 
❧
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32 But remember that Catholicism was also negatively correlated with democracy until the mid-1970s. (Ross 
[2001b:339])
33  This measure is very likely too quantitative. Consider that Iran had as many muslim citizens 1978 as in 
1979. However, in 1979 Khomeyni rose to power, with a significant Islamization of government as a result. In 
this context, estimating the effect of Islam on the state by using muslim percentage of the population is 
clearly a non-optimal process. All that said, I follow Rossʼ debatable approach. 
34 Ross [2001b:339] presents a more extensive argumentation. 
4  Results
 A total of 193 countries over 35 years would yield a theoretical maximum of 6755 
observations, but since several states have not existed the full time series and some 
variables do not cover the full set of observations, the effective number of cases utilized in 
the regression below is 3395.
 A first look at a histogram over the Hydrocarbons variable reveals a heavily skewed 
frequency: Most countries by far did either not extract any oil, gas, or coal at all, or did so 
only in negligible quantities. About 62% of the observations show rentierism rates lower 
than 0.01, i.e. hydrocarbon rents constituting less than 1% of GDP. 15.5%, or 764 cases, 
display rentierism of more than 0.1.35  This skewness is even greater when it comes to 
Hard Minerals, with more than 78% of all observations below 0.01, and only 163 above 
0.1.36 The conclusion drawn from this is that relatively  very few countries qualify as being 
rentiers and that the ten hard minerals included here are either not extracted in volumes 
great enough, or are perhaps not valuable enough, to constitute as large a fraction of state 
revenues as are hydrocarbons. 
 The top twenty hydrocarbon rentiers, as well as the top ten hard mineral rentiers, of the 
1990s are listed in Appendix 3. 
4;1  The Democratic Performance of Rentiers; An Overview
 When looking at the hydrocarbon rentiers in that list, their most prominent feature is that 
during this period they were all more or less authoritarian, perhaps with the exceptions of 
Venezuela and Russia.37 The mean democratic score of these twenty countries between 
1990 and 1999, was in fact a mere 1.06, which lends some initial empirical support to the 
resource curse hypothesis. In figure three I enhance this support, by using a broader time 
range and including valuable points of comparison. Figure 3 illustrates the mean 
democratic performance of five groups of observations between 1970 and 2003. “Full Set” 
24
35 In 16 cases the rentierism exceeds 1.0. This is possible because rents and GDP are calculated using 
different measures. Of these sixteen cases thirteen belongs to Turkmenistan, two to Iraq, and one to Kuwait. 
All are coded missing. 
36 Three observations display values below zero (se fn. above). They are coded missing.
37 Although in both states democracy has without doubt been eroded in recent years.
self-evidently covers all observations in set (4756 obs.). “High GDP p.c.” includes all 
observations with a GDP per capita of more than $10,000 (1134 obs.), and subsequently 
“Low GDP p.c.” includes all observations with a GDP per capita of less than $10,000 GDP 
per capita (3246 obs.). “Hydrocarbon Rentiers” represents all observations where 
hydrocarbon rents constitute more than 10% of GDP (676 obs.), and finally “Hard Mineral 
Rentiers” consists of all observations where hard mineral rents constitute more than 5% of 
GDP (248 obs.).
 As illustrated the mean democratic score for hydrocarbon rentiers is strikingly low. While 
the world as a whole in recent years has become ʻmore democratic than notʼ, petro-states 
seem to be permanently  stuck in the bottom third. When looking at the graphs above, the 
close relationship  between democracy and GDP per capita is prominent, but even though 
hydrocarbon rentiers are decisively outperformed by poor countries this is not due to any 
poverty on their behalf, quite the opposite. The average GDP per capita for the rentiers is 
$12,568, compared to the scarce $3340 for the “Low GDP p.c.” group. Hence, the 
difference between their scores is even more dramatic than a first glance suggests. 
 As for hard mineral rentiers, on the other hand, the results are harder to analyze. In 
comparison with the other groups, the graph is rather unstable, probably  due to relatively 
few observations. Throughout the 1990s they actually achieve higher democratic scores 
than the overall average, but these results should be taken with a grain of salt since each 
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annual average here is derived from only three to six observations. Of course, the very fact 
that there are not more mineral rentiers than that does harm the theoretical speculation.38
 So what do these results tell us? While they certainly cannot prove anything they are, in 
my opinion, nevertheless suggestive. At least when it comes to hydrocarbon rentiers, the 
resource curse claim has passed a first test, since their democratic performance is 
extraordinarily low. In addition, the authoritarian characteristics of many petro-states 
cannot be explained away  with poverty. The Hydrocarbons variable actually correlates 
positively (0.2833) with GDP per capita.39 
4;2  The FGLS Regression
 However, the test above is certainly  a crude one and neglects some variables that 
possibly could affect the results. What if the authoritarianism in these states is not due to 
rentierism but in fact caused by another factor? Since Hydrocarbons correlates to a 
noteworthy degree with Islam (0.4312), as well as Mideast (0.5718) and Arabian Peninsula 
(0.6606) and each of these variables in turn correlate negatively with democracy (-0.4691, 
-0.3132, and -0.2349 respectively), it is certainly possible that religion and/or region could 
undermine the explanatory power so far bestowed on rentierism. 
 The proper way of handling this kind of data is as mentioned by using a feasible 
generalized least squares method, or FGLS for short. Table 1 reports the outcome of this 
regression, and while the relative effect of the presented coefficients is intrinsically 
problematic to estimate, I primarily look for three indicators: First I want to know if the 
effect is positive or negative. Second, I have to establish whether this effect is statistically 
significant, and finally I want to see what happens to the magnitude of the coefficients 
when additional variables are included.
 In a first step I regress Hydrocarbons and Hard Minerals on Regime, under control for 
only Regimet-5 and Incomet-5, which are both lagged five years. The outcome of this run is 
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38 We should, however, be aware of that some authoritarian mineral rentiers, such as Liberia, lack 
democracy scores for this period, and that faulty GDP figures for others makes it impossible to calculate 
rentierism in the first place. The observations least likely to be missing is of course those for relatively stable 
states, e.g. Chile and Papua New Guinea, which score high in democracy.
39 Even if Herb [2003;8] surely has a point when he claims that poverty, in a sense, causes rentierism.
presented in Column 1. Additional control variables are then added to the regression with 
results reported in Column 2 and onwards. 
Table 1
Rentierism and Democracy
(Dependent Variable is Regime)
________________________________________________________________________
1. 2. 3. 4.
Regimet-5 .8268032*** .7804319*** .7427678*** .7481486***
(.0095259) (.0104354) (.0108961) (.0108831)
Hydrocarbonst-5 -3.17583*** -1.590148*** -1.535748*** -1.521891***
(.3259647) (.3596939) (.3668574) (.3965848)
Hard Mineralst-5 -2.141449** -1.985129** -1.166078 -1.069393
(.7501294) (.739) (.7334875) (.7354017)
Incomet-5 .0000336*** .0000206*** .0000169** .000019**
(4.96e-06) (5.96e-06) (5.97e-06) (6.72e-06)
Islam – -.0102649*** -.0075146*** -.0101893***
(.0010757) (.0012455) (.0010893)
OECD – .4783686*** .4456037*** .4362086***
(.1293235) (.1255417) (.1284831)
Size – -.2824265* – –
(.1308383)
Mideast – – -.7906065*** –
(.1569705)
Sub-Saharan Africa – – -.8974678*** -.7583373***
(.0881361) (.0838)
Arabian Peninsula – – – -.6535271**
(.2530646)
Observations 3400 3395 3395 3395
Countries 151 150 150 150
Log likelihood -7130.17 -7061.678 -7011.189 -7020.495
* significant at the 0.05 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; *** significant at the 0.001 level
! Variables attached with “t-5” are entered with five-year lags. Standard errors are in parentheses below the 
coefficients. Regressions run with Feasible Generalized Least Squares, using Stata 9.1. First-order 
autocorrelation are corrected for using a panel-specific process. 
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 The first regression (Column 1) shows both Hydrocarbons and Hard Minerals to indeed 
have a negative relationship to Regime, and this relationship  is statistically  significant at 
the 0.001 level for the former and at the 0.01 level for the latter. In Column 2 Islam, OECD, 
and Size have been added to the picture and while the coefficient for Hydrocarbons are 
cut in half the results hang on to their significance. This suggests that the ʻbadnessʼ of oil 
and mineral wealth is not merely dependent upon religion or non-Western status and does 
not only occur in small states.
 The final step is to include Mideast, Arabian Peninsula, and Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Column 3 and 4 disclose at least three points of interest: i) As expected all three regional 
dummies correlate negatively with Regime. For various reasons these regions are more 
authoritarian than are other parts of the world. ii) Even with this negative effect accounted 
for the Hydrocarbons coefficient stays negative and significant at the 0.001 level. iii) 
However, although Hard Minerals remains negative the Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 
renders it insignificant. 
4;3  Replacing Regime
 According to Herb [2003:15] the Polity data set used by Ross and myself, is in this very 
context perhaps not the optimal measure of democracy. He claims that this measure 
carries a debatable bias against monarchies, and since many petro-rentiers have this type 
of regime this bias is potentially  problematic. He exemplifies with the “bizarre” fact that 
Qatar in 1999, because of its monarchy, had lower democracy score than Hitlerʼs 
Germany. [ibid.] In his own analysis he therefore uses democracy scores from Freedom 
House instead. Following Herbʼs criticism I check my results by  replacing the Polity  IV 
score (Regime) with the Freedom House Imputed Polity measure (Freedom House). 
 A first quick comparison reveals that the simple correlation between the two measures 
is 0.9721, i.e. extremely  high, and the mean-democracy graphs have a most similar 
appearance. (Detailed results are found in Appendix 4.) The FGLS regression, however, 
yields a somewhat different result, but contrary to Herbʼs premonition, using the Freedom 
House measure actually  lends the theoretical claim additional support. In this run Hard 
Minerals in fact manages to stay significant (at the 0.05 level) even after the inclusion of 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The Hydrocarbons coefficient is persistently negative at the 0.001 
level of significance throughout this alternative test. 
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4;3  Deduced Findings
 The figures above clearly indicate that extracted wealth does seem to represent a 
harmful impact on democracy. The first and foremost finding is that hydrocarbon 
abundance, measured as rents by GDP, arguably makes governments more authoritarian 
in nature, since other potential determinants such as income and country-specific past 
have been accounted for. That this negative effect keeps its extraordinary significance 
even after religion and region-specific factors have been brought into the picture is indeed 
thought-provoking. The ʻbadnessʼ of oil revenues upon government is consequently  not a 
phenomenon limited to the Mideastern region, nor is it dependent upon Islam. These 
findings are strongly supportive of Rossʼ and also of the theoretical claims of rentier state 
scholars. 
 As for the supposed effect of hard minerals the results have on the other hand been 
less conclusive. While hard mineral rents also correlate with authoritarian rule, their 
ʻbadnessʼ seem to be to some extent dependent on the performance of African nations 
south of Sahara. When those are controlled for, statistical significance is lost. On the other 
hand it is noteworthy that the Hard Minerals coefficient is significant when using an 
alternative proxy for democracy, Freedom House. 
 While the effect of mineral wealth therefore is hard to affirm, it is apparent that the hard 
minerals included in this study have lesser ability  to dominate the economy of a state, than 
does hydrocarbons, and do not seem to affect democracy as badly. I would like to stress 
though that the hard mineral rentierism of many  states arguably is somewhat 
underevaluated by the simple fact that the data only cover ten different minerals. It is 
especially  unfortunate that figures for gemstones are missing since they are extraordinary 
valuable and consequently generate substantial rents. 
❧
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5 ⏐ Conclusion
 The aim of this study has been to retest the findings of Michael L. Ross [2001b] and 
thereby further investigating the idea of a resource curse affecting governments in 
resource-rich states. The results largely support this hypothesis. Out of the three questions 
presented in section 3;1, this study reinforce two and a half, leaving out only the claim of a 
hard mineral curse outside Africa. Note however, that my findings do not refute this claim, 
but weakly support it.
 The overall conclusion of this study is consequently that oil, gas, and to some extent 
also hard minerals, do seem to generate a bad kind of wealth that arguably inhibits and 
reverses the democratization processes in many nations around the world. The 
implications for states, especially poor developing ones, that ʻdecideʼ40 to put their hope in 
extracted wealth, are distinctly negative.
 Not only does this add to the rentier state theory  and supports the notion of a natural 
resource curse, it also fortifies the persistent modernization theory. Rentier wealth indeed 
seems to be an exception to the rule that GDP per capita goes hand in hand with 
democratization. If the bad wealth is accounted for, the modernization theory should gain 
explanatory power. This is however not to say that regions rich in resources should be left 
out of comprehensive democratization studies: it is instead a call for rentierism to be 
considered a variable of great import. 
 This study has not been conducted with the aim of finding a panacea for this puzzling 
phenomenon. I have instead presented the resource curse as an intricate trap, a catch-22, 
and such a situation may  indeed prove problematic to grapple with. In my view, many 
solutions claimed to neutralize the bad effects of natural resource abundance often seem 
to be themselves undermined by those same resources. In other words, how is a resource 
rich country supposed to reform economically as well as politically and amend institutions 
if the problem in the first place is that resource wealth constitutes a significant obstruction 
to reform and makes institutions dysfunctional? The proposed solutions are thus often 
made obsolete by the very symptoms of the curse. 
 The resource problem becomes even more aggravated by the fact that commodity 
prices in recent years have hit all-time highs. According to Karlʼs [1999:48] concluding 
words the possibility of successful reform is contingent on low prices since windfalls both 
tend to insulate leadership and cement adverse institutions. She wrote that after the price 
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40 To be sure, it is rarely a free choice.
of oil had collapsed to about $12 per barrel. Today (05/23/2008), nine years later, it has 
ascended to more than nine times that.41 Gold prices have also experienced a similar hike, 
climbing from under $40 per ounce in 1970 to over $1000 per ounce in mid-March 2008.42 
 In a Foreign Policy article from 2006, columnist Thomas L. Friedman develops what he 
calls the First Law of Petropolitics, stating that “the price of oil and the pace of freedom 
always move in opposite directions in oil-rich petrolist states”.43  Even if this correlation 
hardly  should be considered law, nor the curse as inevitable, the findings of this study 
should markedly lower the expectations of democracy in many natural resource-reliant 
states around the world.
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41 Source: New Mexico Tech. http://octane.nmt.edu/gotech/Main.aspx
42 Source: Kitco. http://www.kitco.com/charts/historicalgold.html
43 Source: Foreign Policy May/June 2006: “The First Law of Petropolitics” by Thomas L. Friedman.
 Appendix 1
Detailed Presentation of Variables
All data have been accessed through The Quality  of Government Data set, Göteborg 
University  (compiled by Teorell et al. [2008]), with invaluable assistance from Marcus 
Samanni. 
• Regime is an interval variable that measures a countryʼs democratic performance. I 
derive this measure from the Polity IV data set compiled by Marshall & Jaggers 
[2002]. Position on an eleven point scale indicates a countryʼs performance regarding 
three general principles of democracy; i) the effective possibility of political 
participation, ii) institutionalized constraints on the executive, and iii) guaranteed civil 
liberties. These three basic concepts are held as the fundamental prerequisites for 
more specific democratic institutions. Countries are graded between 0 (perfect 
autocracy) and 10 (perfect democracy). 
• Freedom House is a similar eleven point variable that also measures democratic 
performance but is based on the combined Freedom House measure of Civil Liberties 
and Political Rights. I use the imputed version, which has better coverage. Countries 
are graded between 0 (perfect autocracy) and 10 (perfect democracy).
• Income is based on real GDP per capita measured in constant dollars chain series. 
Base year is 2000. The data originate from Penn World Table version 6.2, by Heston 
et al. [2006].
• Hydrocarbons is a variable measuring the relative size of hydrocarbon rents in 
government, i.e. rentierism, and it is created in several individual steps. Resource rent 
is first defined as the collected profit of a commodity, after location-specific production 
costs have been subtracted. The rent per unit of output is then multiplied with the total 
amount extracted, which compute the total annual rent. This calculation is done for 
each mineral, each country, and each year. The rents from oil, gas, hard coal, and 
brown coal extraction are then annually  added to each other and ultimately divided by 
the countryʼs GDP. The final measure stretches from 0,00 (no rentierism) to 1,00 (total 
rentierism). The rent data cover the years 1970-2004, and come from the World Bank 
Adjusted Net Saving Data Center. The GDP data are in current dollars and come from 
the World Bank Development Indicators 2007. 
• Hard Minerals is an identically calculated variable but evaluate the relative size of rent 
from hard minerals in government. Ten different hard minerals are included: Bauxite, 
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copper, iron, lead, nickel, phosphate, tin, zinc, silver, and gold. The ten rents are 
added to one another and divided by GDP, creating one measure per year and 
country, just like above.
 The construction of Hydrocarbons and Hard Minerals have been accompanied by a few 
practical complications. The data for each mineral do understandably not account for every 
state, simply because not every single state has extracted, letʼs say, bauxite. These 
observations should however not go missing but rather be coded as $0, which indicate 
that the country received $0 in revenue from that mineral, that year. So far, so good. But 
what if an observation is missing when the country in question very likely  extracted that 
particular mineral? Take e.g. the data on bauxite rent for Zimbabwe 1998-2004. These 
observations should, judging from the figures from previous years, be coded as missing, 
not $0. But since Hard Minerals are calculated as the sum of bauxite and nine other 
minerals, this would unfortunately invalidate all observations for Zimbabwe during these 
years. That would clearly be non-optimal because Zimbabwe also extracted several other 
minerals these years for which data in fact are provided. To interpolate or extrapolate any 
values would require an in-depth qualitative analysis of each country and year, which is 
something that cannot be done here and now. I have therefore chosen to keep all original 
values as they are and code all missing values as $0, even those where extraction most 
likely  took place. This is, to be sure, a controversial choice, but remember that all minerals 
not included are by default also coded as $0. The combined hard mineral rents for several 
countries are regrettably already underestimated.
• Islam is a variable measuring the Muslim percentage of a stateʼs population in 1980. I 
use only this year since the proportion of the population with religious affiliation tends 
not to change much over time. For countries formed more recently, figures of later 
date have of course been used. Data come from La Porta et al. [1999].
• OECD is a dummy variable coded 1 for the twenty-five countries defined by the World 
Bank as high-income OECD members, including; Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Korea (Rep.), Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K., and the U.S.A. All other countries are coded 0.
• Size is a dummy variable coded 1 for all countries with a population below one million 
and 0 otherwise. Population data are obtained from Penn World Table 6.2 and 
measured every year. 
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• Mideast is a dummy variable coded 1 for the following countries, classified by the 
World Bank as residing in this region (which include North Africa), and 0 otherwise: 
Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
• Arabian Peninsula is a dummy variable coded 1 for the seven states found on the 
Saudi Arabian Peninsula; Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United 
Arab Emirates, and Yemen, and 0 otherwise.
• Sub-Saharan Africa is dummy variable coded 1 for the following forty-five countries 
that, according to the World Bank Country Classification, are located in this region, 
and 1970 had a population of more than one hundred thousand: Angola, Benin, 
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Comoros, Congo (Dem. Rep.), Congo (Rep.), Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,  Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. All other countries are 
coded 0.
 Appendix 2
Table 2
Summary of Variables
________________________________________________________________________
 Variable Obs. Meana Std. Dev. Min. Max.
 Regime 4906 3,93 4,21464 0 10
 Regime/FH 5264 5,22 3,51816 0 10
 Income 5180 7713 8744,04591 170,55 84408,23
 Hydrocarbons 5011 0,0536 0,12614 0 0,9996
 Hard Minerals 5024 0,0114 0,04281 0 0,6739889
 Islam 6160 24,66 36,29656 0 99,9
a The means have all been rounded off. 
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 Appendix 3
Table 3
Index of Top 20 Hydrocarbon Rentiers 1990-1999
Country Rentierism (mean) Obs.
Iraq .8740946 3
Turkmenistan .6111696 5
Kuwait .3927908 10
Saudi Arabia .3798523 10
Nigeria .349137 10
Qatar .34169 10
Oman .3382714 10
Bahrain .2819573 10
Syria .278025 10
Azerbaijan .2700923 10
United Arab Emirates .2679998 10
Yemen .2652231 10
Iran .2526117 8
Venezuela .2506637 10
Libya .2484708 10
Uzbekistan .2017763 10
Angola .1977809 10
Congo (Rep.) .1913127 10
Russian Federation .1768083 10
Kazakhstan .167819 10
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 Appendix 4
Results from using the Freedom House Measure
Table 4
Index of Top 10 Hard Mineral Rentiers 1990-1999
Country Rentierism (mean) Obs.
Mauritania .1545155 10
Liberia .150018 10
Papua New Guinea .1384624 10
Chile .0650507 10
Guyana .0647832 10
Zambia .0569682 10
Mongolia .0553037 10
Guinea .0402552 10
Suriname .038481 10
Jamaica .0240437 10
Figure 4
Democratic Performance in the World 1972-2003
Sources: Democratic performance 
is derived from Freedom House 
data and presented as means. 
Values for 1982 are interpolated. 
Data on GDP per capita come 
from Penn World Table. 
Full Set
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Low GDP p.c.
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❧Rentierism and Democracy
(Dependent Variable is Freedom House)
________________________________________________________________________
1. 2. 3. 4.
Freedom Houset-5 .813364*** .7588231*** .7322856*** .7352351***
(.0093588) (.0102351) (.0108141) (.0107754)
Hydrocarbonst-5 -2.920312*** -1.564299*** -1.576052*** -1.579584***
(.2617032) (.2834751) (.2909047) (.3055123)
Hard Mineralst-5 -1.928067** -1.879405** -1.498316* -1.455021*
(.6302201) (.6174708) (.6165067) (.6170341)
Incomet-5 .0000229*** .0000102* 7.96e-06 9.56e-06
(3.83e-06) (4.69e-06) (4.59e-06) (4.94e-06)
Islam – -.0098405*** -.0086709*** -.009843***
(.0008711) (.0009845) (.0008855)
OECD – .4771475*** .4524021*** .4394065***
(.1027254) (.0985904) (.0999977)
Size – .0133508 – –
(.0805253)
Mideast – – -.3943838*** –
(.1214781)
Sub-Saharan Africa – – -.4798038*** -.4157934***
(.0698964) (.066862)
Arabian Peninsula – – – -.3558369
(.1851819)
Observations 3467 3461 3461 3461
Countries 165 164 164 164
Log likelihood -6477.783 -6389.634 -6365.443 -6368.86
* significant at the 0.05 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; *** significant at the 0.001 level
! Variables attached with “t-5” are entered with five-year lags. Standard errors are in parentheses below the 
coefficients. Regressions run with Feasible Generalized Least Squares, using Stata 9.1. First-order 
autocorrelation are corrected for using a panel-specific process. 
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